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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of international trade in a general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous firms where a welfare state redistributes income. We look
at a very stylised progressive non-distortionary redistribution scheme. We show that
for a given tax rate international trade increases income per capita, but also leads
to higher income inequality. Two aspects of income inequality are examined. First,
inter-group inequality between managers and workers is considered. Second, intra-
group inequality within the group of managers is investigated. For a given tax rate
the size of the welfare state and therefore the transfer per capita increases when
going from autarky to trade. This second-round effect counteracts the primary
increase in inequality, yet cannot outweigh it. Since the redistribution scheme is
non-distortionary, it is possible to decrease trade-induced inequality by increasing
the tax rate without jeopardising the gains from trade.
JEL classification: D31; F12; F16; H24; H25
Keywords : International trade; Income inequality; Redistribution; Heterogeneous
firms
†Faculty of Business and Economics, Dresden University of Technology, Helmholtzstr. 10, 01069
Dresden, Germany. E-mail: miriam.kohl@tu-dresden.de
1 Introduction
Distributional effects of globalisation are a crucial concern in the public debate. It is also a
classical question in academia. Research on this topic dates back to the famous work by Stolper
and Samuelson (1941). In the last few years we saw a growing body of literature that addresses
the link between international trade and the income distribution exploiting heterogeneity 1. What
is generally found is that there are gains from trade but these overall gains come at a cost: a rise
in income inequality. This trade-induced rising inequality might lead to a protectionist drift in
society as argued by Scheve and Slaughter (2007). Therefore it might be important to accompany
trade liberalisation with carefully chosen redistribution policies in order for the current levels of
economic integration to be sustainable. According to Scheve and Slaughter (2007) “a New Deal for
globalisation” is needed - linking trade liberalisation to redistribution policies. This paper sheds
light on exactly this issue. It is therefore vital to explicitly model a welfare state and then look
at the picture of trade-induced inequality. We want to know how trade affects inequality in the
presence of a welfare state and whether it is possible to decrease trade-induced inequality without
jeopardising the gains from trade. Therefore this paper integrates a welfare state into a new trade
theory model that links globalisation and inequality.
In terms of the basic model setup this paper is closely linked to Egger and Kreickemeier
(2012), which is a trade model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. Actually we
use a simplified version of this model with perfect labour markets. The basic set-up is as follows.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their managerial skill. According to their skill individuals choose
whether to become a manager or a worker. Individuals can use their managerial skill only if they
decide to become managers. If they become workers, they can not use their managerial skill.
Hence, managers are heterogeneous and it is assumed that the ability of the manager determines
the productivity of the firm they are running. Managerial income is given by the profits of the firm.
Workers, in contrast, are paid the same wage regardless in which firm they are employed. In each
firm there will be one manager and an endogenous number of workers. The welfare state is modelled
as follows. We look at a non-distortionary tax-transfer system. The redistribution scheme is
financed by a proportional tax on both profit and wage income and gives the same absolute transfer
to all individuals.2 The occupational choice is modelled as in Lucas (1978). Individuals compare
their income in the two occupations. Hence the labour indifference condition implicitly determines
the ability of the marginal manager. The labour indifference condition together with the resource
constraint pins down the equilibrium factor allocation in the economy. Welfare is calculated in a
1See Egger and Kreickemeier (2009a, 2012); Helpman et al. (2010); Yeaple (2005). For a non-technical overview
on this topic see Harrison et al. (2011).
2This redistribution scheme can be seen as a very stylised representation of a progressive tax-transfer system.
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utilitarian way as per capita income. The model features both inter-group inequality, i.e. inequality
between the group of managers and the group of workers, and intra-group inequality, i.e. inequality
within the group of managers. Inter-group inequality is calculated as the ratio between average
post tax-transfer profit income and post tax-transfer labour income. Intra-group inequality is
determined using the Gini criterion. Trade is considered between two symmetric countries, Home
and Foreign. There are two types of costs involved with trade. First, there is the standard iceberg
transport cost. Second, there is a fixed cost involved with exporting, since an export consultant
needs to be hired. This export consultant is paid the economy wide wage. This leads to self-
selection of the most productive firms into exporting.
As shown in Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) trade leads to aggregate welfare gains. The reason
for this finding is the higher cutoff productivity in the open economy that leads to an efficiency
gain for the economy. However, ceteris paribus, the open economy equilibrium features also higher
inequality: both higher inter-group inequality and higher intra-group inequality among managers
measured by the Gini coefficient. We find that the non-distortionary redistribution scheme consid-
ered does not affect the occupational choice of individuals. The implication of this finding is that
the cutoff ability level, the factor allocation and welfare do not depend on the tax-transfer system.
It is therefore possible to decrease trade-induced inequality by accompanying trade liberalisation
with an increase in the tax rate. Furthermore we find that due to gains from trade the size of the
welfare state in the open economy is higher than the size of the welfare state in the closed economy.
This leads to an increase in the transfer per capita - an effect that c.p. decreases inequality. How-
ever, this non-trivial second-round effect cannot outweigh for the primary trade-induced increase
in inequality.
This paper is linked to the heterogeneous firms trade literature that was started by Melitz
(2003). There are several papers that look at distributional effects of globalisation in models of
heterogeneous agents (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009a, 2012; Helpman et al., 2010; Yeaple,
2005). Crucial to our paper is an occupational choice mechanism that is modelled as in Lucas
(1978). Models in international trade that use occupational choice are Antràs et al. (2006), Monte
(2011), Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) and Egger et al. (2015). Since the model features inequality
in managerial income, it is also related to the literature that tries to explain CEO payments (see
Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Gabaix et al., 2014; Gersbach and Schmutzler, 2007). To the best of
our knowledge the functioning of a welfare state in international trade models with heterogeneous
firms, which is the focus of our paper, is not thoroughly investigated in the literature so far. There
are only a few other papers that look at similar issues, in different frameworks though. Egger and
Kreickemeier (2009b) introduce a redistribution scheme in a trade model where a fair-wage effort
mechanism leads to firm-specific wages. They show that with a suitably chosen increase in the
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profit tax rate higher welfare and a more equal income distribution than in autarky is possible
under trade. However with production labour as the only input factor, this model cannot address
inter-group inequality and intra-group inequality among the group of managers. Hence, it can be
seen complementary to what we are doing. Itskhoki (2008) focuses on the optimal policy response
to trade-induced inequality and the trade-off between efficiency and equality. He shows that the
optimal policy response to trade-induced inequality may be to decrease marginal tax rates. There
is another recent paper by Antràs et al. (2016) that looks at redistributing gains from trade when
redistribution is costly. However, the trade model they consider is much more parsimonious than
the trade model in our paper. Furthermore, their model is not suitable to discuss inter-group
inequality and intra-group inequality among managers.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we derive the closed economy
equilibrium, i.e. we solve for the factor allocation, welfare and the income distribution. In Section
3 we look at the open economy equilibrium and discuss the effects of trade. Section 4 concludes by
summarizing the most important results and puts the contribution of this very paper into context.
2 The closed economy
Individuals
Following Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) we assume an economy that is populated by individuals
where the mass of individuals is denoted by N . These individuals are heterogeneous in their man-
agerial ability. Individuals can use their managerial ability if they decide to become a manager
(mass of managers denoted by M). However, they cannot use their managerial ability in the role
as workers (mass of workers denoted by L). Managers earn the firm’s profit whereas workers are
paid an economy wide wage.
The final goods sector
Final output is a homogeneous good. Following Ethier (1982) and Egger et al. (2015) let final
output be a CES-aggregate of all varieties v, such that
Y =
[∫
v∈V
q(v)
σ−1
σ dv
] σ
σ−1
, (1)
where q(v) is the quantity of variety v, V is the set of all available varieties with measure M and
σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the different varieties of intermediate goods. The
production function has external increasing returns to scale and is homogeneous of degree σ/(σ−1)
with respect to the number of varieties, which is the standard textbook case. Since final output is
chosen as the numéraire its price is normalised to one. We assume perfect competition in the final
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goods sector and therefore get the following demand function for each variety v
q(v) = Y p(v)−σ , (2)
where p(v) is the price of variety v.
The intermediate goods sector
We assume monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods sector. The mass of intermediate
goods producers is equal to M . In each firm there will be one manager and an endogenous number
of workers, l(v). Managers are heterogeneous in their ability. We assume that the ability of
the manager determines firm productivity, ϕ(v). The number of workers employed in a firm is
proportional to output, i.e. q(v) = ϕ(v)l(v). The unit production costs for each firm are given by
c(v) = w/ϕ(v), where w is the economy wide wage. Since individuals cannot use their managerial
ability if they decide to become a worker, workers are identical and hence are paid the same wage,
w. Profit maximisation at the level of intermediate goods producers gives the price of each variety
as a constant mark-up over marginal costs
p(v) =
σ
σ − 1
c(v), (3)
where the price is firm specific because marginal costs are firm specific. Equilibrium output q(v)
and equilibrium revenue r(v) in the intermediate goods sector are given by
q(v) = Y
(
σ
σ − 1
c(v)
)
−σ
and r(v) = Y
(
σ
σ − 1
c(v)
)1−σ
. (4)
Hence, operating profits are given by
piop =
1
σ
r(v). (5)
By calculating relative output, employment, revenues and profits of two firms 1 and 2 we get
q(v1)
q(v2)
=
(
ϕ(v1)
ϕ(v2)
)σ
and
l(v1)
l(v2)
=
r(v1)
r(v2)
=
piop(v1)
piop(v2)
=
(
ϕ(v1)
ϕ(v2)
)σ−1
. (6)
We hence see that firms run by managers with higher managerial ability have higher output, rev-
enues and operating profits and employ more workers.
Average productivity
As it is very common in this literature we assume productivity to be Pareto distributed. The
distribution function is given by G(ϕ) = 1−
(
ϕmin
ϕ
)k
, where the lower bound, ϕmin is normalised
4
to one. We can then relate average productivity ϕ˜ to the cutoff productivity ϕ∗
ϕ˜ =
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗, (7)
where k > σ − 1 is assumed.3
The redistribution scheme
We now want to introduce a simple redistribution scheme. The redistribution scheme is financed
by a proportional tax on income (both profit and wage income) and this tax revenue is then lump-
sum redistributed to all individuals. The tax rate is imposed by the government and given by
t ∈ (0, 1). Taking into account the budget constraint of the government, the transfer income b for
each individual is equal to
b =
tMp¯i + tLw
N
. (8)
Occupational choice
According to their skill individuals decide whether to become a manager or a worker (see Lucas,
1978; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2012). They compare their income in the two occupations. Hence,
the labour indifference condition that implicitly determines the ability of the marginal manager is
given by
(1− t)w + b = (1− t)pi(ϕ∗) + b, (9)
where ϕ∗ denotes the ability of the marginal manager. This means that individuals with an ability
ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ choose to become managers. Individuals with ϕ < ϕ∗ choose to become workers. Having
a closer look at Eq. (9) it becomes obvious that the labour indifference condition can easily be
reduced to
w = pi∗. (10)
This implies that the occupational choice and hence the ability of the marginal manager is not
affected by the tax-transfer system. This finding has important implications for the factor alloca-
tion and welfare in the economy as will be discussed in what follows.
Equilibrium factor allocation
Aggregate profits are given by Π = 1
σ
Y . Aggregate labour income is given by wL = σ−1
σ
Y . The
labour indifference condition, Eq. (10), states that the labour income per worker, needs to be equal
3The derivation of Eq. (7) can be found in the Appendix.
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to the profits of the marginal firm. Using Eq. (6) together with Eq. (7) we get
(σ − 1)Y
σL
=
Y
σM
(
k − (σ − 1)
k
)
. (11)
We can solve Eq. (11) for the total mass of workers L and get
L =
k(σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
M, (12)
which gives an upward sloping relationship between the mass of workers and the mass of managers
as illustrated in Figure 1. An increase in the mass of workers reduces the labour income per worker
ceteris paribus, therefore the mass of managers also has to increase (thereby reducing the profit of
the marginal manager) in order to restore indifference. The mass of individuals is denoted by N
and is a parameter in this model. Since individuals choose to become either managers or worker,
the resource constraint of this economy is given by
L = N −M. (13)
The resource constraint is a downward sloping locus in the M − L space as depicted in Figure
1. The resource constraint together with the labour indifference condition determines the mass of
managers and workers in the economy as follows
Mna =
k − (σ − 1)
kσ − (σ − 1)
N and Lna =
k(σ − 1)
kσ − (σ − 1)
N. (14)
Please note that the subscript a indicates the autarky equilibrium and the superscript n shows that
we are looking at the non-distortionary tax-transfer system. We see that the equilibrium factor
allocation does not depend on the redistribution scheme looked at in this section. The cutoff ability
is implicitly determined by M = [1−G(ϕ∗)]N . Solving explicitly for the cutoff ability we get
ϕn∗a =
(
kσ − (σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
) 1
k
. (15)
As depicted in Figure 1 below there is a downward sloping relationship between the mass of man-
agers and the cutoff ability. If all individuals in the economy decide to become managers, the
cutoff ability is at its lower bound which is normalised to one. The cutoff ability does not depend
on the tax-transfer system.
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Figure 1: Closed economy equilibrium with a non-distortionary tax-transfer system
✲✛
✻
ϕ∗
M
L
Lna
Mna
ϕn∗a 1 N
N
LIna
RCa
CA
cf. Egger and Kreickemeier (2012)
Welfare
Welfare is calculated in a utilitarian way as per capita income Y/N . Aggregate income is given by
Y = σΠ = σMpi(ϕ˜). (16)
Profits of the firm with average productivity can be calculated as follows
pi(ϕ˜) =
k
k − (σ − 1)
w =M
1
σ−1
k
k − (σ − 1)
σ − 1
σ
ϕ˜ =M
1
σ−1
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
) σ
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
ϕ∗. (17)
The first equality sign relates profits of the average firm to profits of the marginal firm and uses
the labour indifference condition. The second equality sign uses the mark-up pricing rule for the
average firm. Note that the price of the average firm is given by p(ϕ˜) =M
1
σ−1 . The third equality
sign uses the relationship between the marginal and the average productivity. Hence, we can
calculate aggregate income as follows
Y na =M
σ
σ−1
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
) σ
σ−1
(σ − 1)ϕ∗. (18)
Using the equilibrium values for the mass of firms M and for the cutoff ability ϕ∗ we get the
following expression for per capita income
(
Y
N
)n
a
= (σ − 1)
(
k
kσ − (σ − 1)
) σ
σ−1
(
kσ − (σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
) 1
k
N
1
σ−1 . (19)
We see from this expression that welfare depends on the mass of individuals in the sense that larger
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economies (higher N) enjoy higher welfare. Furthermore we see that welfare does not depend on
the redistribution scheme. The tax-transfer system considered in this section is non-distortionary.
Size of the welfare state
We next want to determine the size of the welfare state. Looking at the budget constraint of the
government, the size of the welfare state is given by SizeWelfareStatena = t [Mp¯i + Lw]. Expressing
all endogenous variables in terms of exogenous parameters, the size of the welfare state is given by
SizeWelfareStatena = t

(σ − 1)( k
kσ − (σ − 1)
N
) σ
σ−1
(
kσ − (σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
) 1
k

 . (20)
Income distribution
We next want to look at the income distribution in the economy. The first inequality measure we
consider is the inter-group inequality, i.e. inequality between the group of managers and the group
of workers. Inter-group inequality is calculated as the ratio between average post tax-transfer
managerial income and post tax-transfer labour income. Hence it is given by the following ratio
InterIneqna =
(1− t)p¯i + b
(1− t)w + b
, (21)
where the numerator denotes after tax profit income plus transfer income and the denominator
denotes after tax wage income plus transfer income. Noting that by virtue of the government
budget constraint the transfer b is equal to tMp¯i+tLw
N
, taking into account that p¯i = pi(ϕ˜) = k
k−(σ−1)w
and using the equilibrium factor allocation, we can calculate inter-group inequality as
InterIneqna =
(1− t) k
k−(σ−1) + t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
1− t+ t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (22)
For t = 0 this expression collapses to k
k−(σ−1) which is greater than unity and represents inter-
group inequality in an economy without a welfare state redistributing income. Clearly, for t = 1
inter-group inequality is equal to unity, i.e. there is no inequality between managers and workers
anymore. It is straightforward to show that ∂InterIneq
n
a
∂t
< 0. This means that inter-group inequality
decreases in the tax rate chosen.
The second inequality measure we consider is intra-group inequality within the group of man-
agers. Intra-group inequality is determined using the Gini criterion, that can be derived from
the Lorenz curve. As a first step we therefore calculate the cumulative managerial income of all
managers with a productivity level lower than or equal to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕ∗,∞] relative to the aggregate
managerial income. With the redistribution scheme in place managerial income consists of profit
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income after taxation plus transfer income. Hence, we get the following expression
(1− t)Π(ϕ¯) + bM(ϕ¯)
(1− t)Π + bM
. (23)
The share of all firms with a productivity smaller than or equal to ϕ¯ is given by
γ = 1−
(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k
. (24)
We can get the following Lorenz curve for managerial income after redistribution4
Qna(γ) =
(1− t) k(σ−1)−k (1− γ)
k−(σ−1)
k − (1− t) k(σ−1)−k + t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1) − t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)(1− γ)
(1− t) k
k−(σ−1) + t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (25)
The Lorenz curve for managerial income shows the share of managerial income that goes to the
lowest γ x 100 percent of firms in the managerial income distribution. The Gini coefficient can
then be computed as
IntraIneqna = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
Qna(γ)dγ =
(1− t) k
k−(σ−1)
σ−1
2k−(σ−1)
(1− t) k
k−(σ−1) + t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (26)
For t = 0 the Gini coefficient collapses to σ−12k−(σ−1) which represents the Gini coefficient in an
economy with no redistribution scheme in place. For t = 1 the Gini coefficient is equal to zero,
which means that there is perfect equality within the group of managers. It is straightforward to
show that ∂IntraIneq
n
a
∂t
< 0. This means that intra-group inequality is decreasing in the tax rate.
3 The open economy
Trade costs
In this section the trading equilibrium will be described. Trade takes place between two identical
countries, Home and Foreign. There are no asymmetries between the two countries. In particular
this implies that also the policy dimension, i.e. the tax rate, is the same in both countries. Trade
is modeled along the lines of Krugman (1980), Ethier (1982) and Melitz (2003). As in Egger and
Kreickemeier (2012), there are two types of costs involved with trade. First, there is the standard
iceberg transport cost, τ > 1. Second, there is a fixed cost involved with exporting since an export
consultant needs to be hired. The export consultant is paid a fee f , which is also endogenous and
equal to the economy wide wage.
4The derivation of the Lorenz curve can be found in the Appendix.
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Redistribution scheme
In this section the effects of trade when a non-distortionary redistribution scheme is in place will
be described. As in the closed economy the redistribution scheme is financed by a proportional tax
on income and this tax revenue is then lump-sum redistributed. Note that in the open economy
there are three possible occupations generating income. First, there is profit income of managers.
Second, there is wage income of workers. Third, there is the income of export consultants. Taking
into account the budget constraint of the government the transfer income for each individual is
equal to
b =
tMp¯io + tLw + tχMf
N
. (27)
Please note that p¯io denotes average profits in the open economy and χ denotes the share of ex-
porting firms in the economy.
Occupational choice
We now want to analyse how the occupational choice by individuals changes in the open economy.
In the open economy individuals can choose among three occupations. Either they become a
manager or a worker or an export consultant. Therefore the indifference condition needs to be
modified as follows
(1− t)pi(ϕ∗) + b = (1− t)w + b = (1− t)f + b. (28)
The post tax-transfer profits of the marginal firm need to be equal both to the post tax-transfer
labour income and to the post tax-transfer export consultant income. We see that it can easily be
reduced to
pi(ϕ∗) = w = f. (29)
We see that Eq. (29) does not depend on the redistribution scheme. Hence, we can conclude
that also in the open economy the tax-transfer system does not affect the occupational choice of
individuals.
The decision to export
Overall operating profits of an exporting firm with domestic revenues r(ϕ) are equal to σ−1Ωr(ϕ),
with 1 < Ω ≡ 1+ τ1−σ ≤ 2. We can formulate the indifference condition for the marginal exporter
as follows
(1− t)
(
Ωr(ϕ∗χ)
σ
− f
)
+ b = (1− t)
r(ϕ∗χ)
σ
+ b. (30)
This means that managers with an ability ϕ ≥ ϕ∗χ choose to become exporters, whereas managers
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with an ability ϕ < ϕ∗χ choose to stay non-exporters. Remember that the fixed cost is endogenous.
In equilibrium the income of the export consultant will just be equal to the profit of the marginal
firm. Hence, using the fact that f = pi(ϕ∗) = r(ϕ
∗)
σ
we can rewrite the exporting indifference
condition as
Ωn = 1 +
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)σ−1
. (31)
The share of exporting firms is denoted by χ and can be calculated as
χn =
1−G(ϕ∗χ)
1−G(ϕ∗)
=
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k
= (Ω− 1)
k
σ−1 = τ−k. (32)
We see that there is a direct link between the iceberg transport cost τ and the share of exporting
firms χ, with 0 < χ < 1. Clearly, the share of exporting firms is declining in the amount of iceberg
transport cost. Also worth mentioning is the fact that the share of exporting firms does not depend
on the tax-transfer system.
Average productivity
As done for the closed economy we define ϕ˜ as the weighted productivity average of all firms selling
in this particular market. We can then write the aggregates in the open economy as follows
Y = (M(1 + χ))
σ
σ−1 q(ϕ˜), R =M(1 + χ)r(ϕ˜) and Π =M(1 + χ)pi(ϕ˜). (33)
Equilibrium factor allocation
In this part the equilibrium factor allocation in the open economy is described and compared to
the autarky equilibrium. Starting point for this analysis is the labour indifference condition for the
open economy, i.e. pi(ϕ∗) = w = f . Using the relationships that pi(ϕ˜) = r(ϕ˜)/σ, pi(ϕ˜)/pi(ϕ∗) =
k/(k − (σ − 1)), (σ− 1)/σY = Lw and Y =M(1 + χ)r(ϕ˜) the labour indifference condition can
be written as
L =
k(σ − 1)(1 + χn)
k − (σ − 1)
M. (34)
This is one of the two important expressions in determining the equilibrium factor allocation. It
gives a positive relationship between the mass of firms and the mass of workers in the economy.
The labour indifference condition is illustrated in Figure 2. We see that it is different from the
labour indifference condition under autarky that has been derived in Section 2. We find that in
the open economy the labour indifference condition is less steep in the L−M space. As outlined
in Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) the argument runs as follows. A given level of operating profits
in the open economy is associated with lower profits of the marginal firm since part of the profits
11
are earned through exporting activity. Therefore the wage also has to fall in order to restore
indifference which is achieved via an increase in the mass of workers. The second relationship that
we need to consider is the resource constraint. It is also different from the resource constraint
under autarky. In the open economy the resource constraint is given by
N = L+M + χnM. (35)
It shows that individuals in the open economy are either employed as production workers or run a
firm as a manager or work as export consultants for an exporting firm. The resource constraint is
also illustrated in Figure 2. Together the labour indifference condition and the resource constraint
determine the equilibrium mass of firms, M and the mass of workers, L
Mno =
k − (σ − 1)
(1 + χn)(kσ − (σ − 1))
N and Lno =
k(σ − 1)
kσ − (σ − 1)
N. (36)
Comparing the equilibrium factor allocation under trade with the equilibrium factor allocation
under autarky we find that the mass of workers stays the same, but the mass of firms is smaller
in the open economy compared to the autarky equilibrium. It is now straightforward to derive
the cutoff ability in the open economy. The cutoff ability is implicitly given by the relation
M = [1−G(ϕ∗)]N . Solving for the cutoff ability we get
ϕn∗o =
(
N
M
) 1
k
=
(
(1 + χn)(kσ − (σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
) 1
k
. (37)
We see that the cutoff ability under trade is higher than under autarky since the mass of firms de-
clines under trade. In Figure 2 the equilibrium factor allocation in the open economy is compared
to the equilibrium factor allocation under autarky.
Welfare
Aggregate output in the open economy is given by Y = M(1 + χ)r(ϕ˜). Following the same steps
as in the derivation of welfare under autarky we get
Y no =M
σ
σ−1
k
k − (σ − 1)
σ
σ−1
(σ − 1)(1 + χn)
σ
σ−1ϕ∗. (38)
Substituting for the mass of firms M and the cutoff productivity ϕ∗ using the equilibrium values
we find
Y no = (σ − 1)
(
k
kσ − (σ − 1)
) σ
σ−1
(
kσ − (σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
) 1
k
N
σ
σ−1 (1 + χn)
1
k . (39)
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Figure 2: Open economy equilibrium with a non-distortionary tax-transfer system
✲✛
✻
✲✛
ϕ∗
M
L
Lno
Mno
ϕn∗o 1 N
N
N
1+χn
LIno
LInaRC
n
a
RCno
CA
cf. Egger and Kreickemeier (2012)
Welfare is defined as per-capita income and is therefore given by
(
Y
N
)n
o
= (σ − 1)
(
k
kσ − (σ − 1)
) σ
σ−1
(
kσ − (σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
) 1
k
N
1
σ−1 (1 + χn)
1
k . (40)
Also in the open economy equilibrium we see the non-distortionary character of the tax-transfer
system. Welfare is not affected by the redistribution scheme. Comparing welfare in the trading
equilibrium with welfare under autarky we see that the following relationship holds
(
Y
N
)n
o
= (1 + χn)
1
k
(
Y
N
)n
a
. (41)
It becomes obvious that welfare in the trading equilibrium is higher than welfare in the autarky
equilibrium. The reason for this finding is the higher cutoff productivity in the open economy that
leads to an efficiency gain for the economy.
Size of the welfare state
We want to see how the size of the welfare state for a given tax rate t is affected by trade. In the open
economy the size of the welfare state is given by SizeWelfareStateno = t [Mp¯io + Lw + χMf ]. Using
all the equilibrium values for the endogenous variable, the size of the welfare state is determined
as follows
SizeWelfareStateno = t

(1 + χn) 1k (σ − 1)( k
kσ − (σ − 1)
N
) σ
σ−1
(
kσ − (σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
) 1
k

 . (42)
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Looking at Eq. (20), it becomes obvious that the following relationship holds for a given tax rate t
SizeWelfareStateno = (1 + χ
n)
1
kSizeWelfareStatena . (43)
Since (1 + χn)
1
k > 1 we can conclude that for a given tax rate t the size of the welfare state in the
open economy equilibrium is greater than the size of the welfare state under autarky. Because the
population size N is exogenously given, this implies also that the transfer per individual increases
when going from the autarky to the open economy equilibrium of the model. This finding should
come as no surprise. The non-distortionary tax-transfer system puts a proportional tax on both
profit and wage income and we already showed that total income in the economy increases due to
trade.
Income distribution
We want to see how the income distribution is affected by trade. We start by looking at inter-group
inequality. Inter-group inequality is measured by the ratio of the average post tax-transfer profit
of domestic firms and post tax-transfer labour income. It can be determined as follows
(1− t)p¯io + b
(1− t)w + b
. (44)
We just argued that the size of the welfare state increases when going from autarky to trade and
this implies a higher transfer per capita in the open economy than in the closed economy. It is
straightforward to show that ceteris paribus a higher transfer decreases inter-group inequality. In
order to establish the overall effect of trade on inequality we first have to solve for inter-group
inequality in terms of only exogenous parameters. Noting that average profits of domestic firms in
the open economy are given by p¯io = (1+χ)pi(ϕ˜)−χf and using the fact that pi(ϕ˜) =
k
k−(σ−1)pi(ϕ
∗)
as well as the equilibrium factor allocation and imposing the budget constraint we can calculate
inter-group inequality in the open economy as follows
InterIneqno =
(1 − t)
(
(1 + χn) k
k−(σ−1) − χ
n
)
+ t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
1− t+ t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (45)
Comparing inter-group inequality in the open economy with inter-group inequality under autarky
it becomes obvious that trade leads to an increase in inter-group inequality. The reason for this
finding is as follows. Although trade leads to an increase in both profit income and labour income,
profit income increases by more than labour income since there are additional profits generated
through exporting. The trade-induced increase in the transfer per capita counteracts this effect,
yet cannot outweigh it. It is important to note that trade in fact leads to an increase in average
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income for both groups in this economy. However, the gap between average incomes of the two
groups in the economy still widens due to trade. It is straightforward to show that ∂InterIneq
n
o
∂t
< 0.
Hence, inter-group inequality decreases in the tax rate.
Within the group of managers inequality is determined by the Gini coefficient. In the open
economy we need to distinguish between exporters and non-exporters within the group of managers.
We therefore get a Lorenz curve with two segments. The Gini coefficient for managerial income in
the open economy with a non-distortionary redistribution scheme in place is given by5
IntraIneqno =
(1− t)(1 + χn) k
k−(σ−1) − (1− t)χ
n − (1− t)(χn)2 σ−12k−(σ−1) − (1− t)
2k
2k−(σ−1)
(1− t)(1 + χn) k
k−(σ−1) − (1− t)χ
n + t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (46)
It is straightforward to show that inequality within the group of managers is higher in the trading
equilibrium than it is under autarky. As described in Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) there are
two effects that lead to this result. First, due to the exporting fixed cost there is selection of only
the most productive firms into exporting. This leads to extra profits of exporting firms relative
to non-exporters. Second, all exporters have to pay the same amount of fixed cost. This means
that the fixed cost are a higher burden for less productive exporters. The transfer per capita is
higher in the open economy than in the closed economy. Ceteris paribus a higher transfer leads
to a decrease in intra-group inequality. However, since there is an overall increase in intra-group
inequality, we conclude that the effects that increase inequality are stronger. It can also be shown
that ∂IntraIneq
n
o
∂t
< 0. This means that intra-group inequality decreases in the tax rate.
For a given tax rate trade leads to more inequality on two fronts: both higher inter-group
inequality and higher intra-group inequality. This result is remarkable in the sense that inequality
rises although the size of the welfare state and hence the transfer payment increases aswell. The
tax-transfer system considered is non-distortionary because it does not affect pre tax-transfer in-
come. Therefore it is always possible to decrease trade-induced inequality without reducing the
gains from trade. In order to achieve this, trade liberalisation needs to be accompanied with an
increase in the tax rate.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyses the effects of international trade in a model with heterogeneous firms where a
welfare state redistributes income. Ceteris paribus, international trade increases aggregate income
but also leads to higher inequality in two important dimensions. Both inter-group inequality and
5The derivation of both the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient is relegated to the Appendix.
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intra-group inequality increase due to trade. For a given tax rate the size of the welfare state
and therefore the transfer per capita increases with trade. This second-round effect c.p. decreases
trade-induced inequality. However it cannot outweigh the primary increase in inequality due
to trade. The non-distortionary redistribution scheme does not affect the occupational choice of
individuals and therefore leaves pre tax-transfer income unaffected. Hence it is possible to decrease
trade-induced inequality without jeopardising the gains from trade by increasing the tax rate. In
order for the current level of economic integration to be sustainable “a New Deal for globalisation”
is needed as argued by Scheve and Slaughter (2007). This new deal should link trade liberalisation
to redistribution policies. Therefore a sound understanding of how globalisation and the welfare
state interact is needed to shape globalisation. This paper aims to contribute to this discussion.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (7)
In order to derive average productivity as a function of marginal productivity we note that average
revenues are given by
r¯ =
1
1−G(ϕ∗)
∫
∞
ϕ∗
r(ϕ)dG(ϕ). (A.1)
Using Eq. (6) and G(ϕ) = 1− ϕ−k we get
r¯ =
k
k − (σ − 1)
r(ϕ∗). (A.2)
Again using Eq. (6) together with Eq. (A.2) we get Eq. (7).
A.2 Derivation of Eq. (25)
The cumulative managerial income of all managers with a productivity level lower than or equal
to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕ∗,∞] relative to the aggregate managerial income is given by Eq. (23). In a next step we
use the budget constraint of the government and the equilibrium factor allocation. Furthermore
noting that Π =Mpi(ϕ˜), pi(ϕ˜)
pi(ϕ∗) =
k
k−(σ−1) ,
pi(ϕ)
pi(ϕ∗) =
(
ϕ
ϕ∗
)σ−1
and M(ϕ¯) =M
(
1−
(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k)
we get
(1− t) k(σ−1)−k
(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k−(σ−1)
− (1− t) k(σ−1)−k + t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1) − t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k
(1− t) k
k−(σ−1) + t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (A.3)
Eq. (A.3) together with Eq. (24) deliver the Lorenz curve for post tax-transfer managerial income.
A.3 Deriving Eq. (46)
When deriving intra-group inequality in the open economy we need to distinguish between ex-
porters and non-exporters. The Lorenz curve will have two segments. The ratio of cumulative
post tax-transfer managerial income for all non-exporters, Ine, with a productivity level lower than
or equal to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕ∗, ϕ∗χ) and aggregate post tax-transfer managerial income in the open economy,
Io, is given by
6
Ine(ϕ¯)
Io
=
(1− t)Πne(ϕ¯) + bM(ϕ¯)
(1− t)Πo + bM
. (A.4)
Noting that
Πne(ϕ¯) =
M
1−G(ϕ∗)
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
pi(ϕ)dG(ϕ) =
k
(σ − 1)− k
Mpi(ϕ∗)
[(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k−(σ−1)
− 1
]
, (A.5)
6Note that it is straightforward to show that this ratio increases in the transfer b.
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where we used Eq. (6);
M(ϕ¯) =
M
1−G(ϕ∗)
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗
dG(ϕ) =M
(
1−
(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k)
; (A.6)
Πo =M [(1 + χ)pi(ϕ˜)− χf ] (A.7)
and using the budget constraint of the government as well as the equilibrium factor allocation we
get
Ine(ϕ¯)
Io
=
(1− t) k(σ−1)−k
(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k−(σ−1)
− (1− t) k(σ−1)−k + t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1) − t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k
(1− t)(1 + χ) k
k−(σ−1) − (1− t)χ+ t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (A.8)
The ratio of firms with productivity levels lower than or equal to ϕ¯ is given by
γ = 1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
)
−k
. (A.9)
Combining Eq. (A.8) with Eq. (A.9) we get the first segment of the Lorenz curve
Q1no (γ) =
(1− t) k(σ−1)−k (1− γ)
k−(σ−1)
k − (1− t) k(σ−1)−k + t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1) − t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)(1− γ)
(1− t)(1 + χ) k
k−(σ−1) − (1− t)χ+ t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (A.10)
Evaluating Q1no at γ = hM with hM ≡ 1−
(
ϕ∗χ
ϕ∗
)−k
= 1− χn yields
Q1no (hM ) =
(1− t) k(σ−1)−k (χ
n)1−
σ−1
k − (1− t) k(σ−1)−k + t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1) − t
kσ
kσ−(σ−1)χ
n
(1− t)(1 + χn) k
k−(σ−1) − (1− t)χ
n + t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (A.11)
The ratio of cumulative post tax-transfer managerial income for all firms (exporters and non-
exporters) with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕ∗χ,∞) and aggregate post tax-transfer managerial
income Io is given by
I(ϕ¯)
Io
= Q1no (hM ) +
(1− t)Πe(ϕ¯) + b
(
M(ϕ¯)−M(ϕ∗χ)
)
(1− t)Πo + bM
. (A.12)
Note that
M(ϕ∗χ) =
M
1−G(ϕ∗)
∫ ϕ∗χ
ϕ∗
dG(ϕ) =M

1−
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k . (A.13)
The exporters profits are given by
Πe(ϕ¯) =
M
1−G(ϕ∗)
∫ ϕ¯
ϕ∗χ
pie(ϕ). (A.14)
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With pie(ϕ) = Ωpi(ϕ)− f and by virtue of Eq. (6) we get
Πe(ϕ¯) =
Mkpi(ϕ∗)Ω
(σ − 1)− k
(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k−(σ−1)
+Mpi(ϕ∗)
(
ϕ∗
ϕ¯
)k
−
Mkpi(ϕ∗)Ω
(σ − 1)− k
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k−(σ−1)
−Mpi(ϕ∗)
(
ϕ∗
ϕ∗χ
)k
.
(A.15)
Using Eqs. (A.6), (A.7), (A.13), (A.15) and taking into account the budget constraint of the
government as well as the equilibrium factor allocation Eq. (A.12) becomes
I(ϕ¯)
Io
= Q1no (hM ) +
−(1− t) kΩ
k−(σ−1)
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
)σ−1−k
+ (1− t)
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
)
−k
+ (1− t) kΩ
k−(σ−1)
(
ϕ∗χ
ϕ∗
)σ−1−k
(1− t)(1 + χn) k
k−(σ−1) − (1− t)χ
n + t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
+
−(1− t)
(
ϕ∗χ
ϕ∗
)−k
+ t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
(
ϕ∗χ
ϕ∗
)−k
− t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
)
−k
(1− t)(1 + χn) k
k−(σ−1) − (1− t)χ
n + t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
. (A.16)
Substituting γ = 1 −
(
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
)
−k
and hM ≡ 1 −
(
ϕ∗χ
ϕ∗
)−k
= 1 − χn we get the second segment of the
Lorenz curve
Q2no (γ) ≡ Q1
n
o (hM ) +
−(1− t) kΩ
k−(σ−1)(1− γ)
k−(σ−1)
k + (1− t)(1− γ) + (1− t) kΩ
k−(σ−1) (χ
n)
k−(σ−1)
k
(1− t)(1 + χn) k
k−(σ−1) − (1− t)χ
n + t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
+
−(1− t)χn + t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)χ
n − t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)(1− γ)
(1− t)(1 + χn) k
k−(σ−1) − (1− t)χ
n + t kσ
kσ−(σ−1)
(A.17)
with Q1no (hM ) = Q2
n
o (hM ).
Putting the two segment together, the Lorenz curve in the open economy with the non-distortionary
redistribution scheme in place can be written as
Qno (γ) ≡

Q1
n
o (γ) if γ ∈ [0, hM )
Q2no (γ) if γ ∈ [hM , 1].
(A.18)
The Gini coefficient for the post-tax-transfer managerial income distribution can then be calculated
as
IntraIneqno = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
Qno (γ)dγ = 1− 2
[∫ hM
0
Q1no (γ)dγ +
∫ 1
hM
Q2no (γ)dγ
]
. (A.19)
Using Eqs. (A.10) and (A.17) and following tedious but straightforward calculation we get Eq.
(46).
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